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Higher-Order Vagueness and the Vague-
ness of ‘Vague’
Achille C. Varzi 
Sorensen () has argued that ‘vague’ is itself a vague predicate; it is
just as sorites-prone as its positive instances. This result has been
exploited by Hyde () in an ingenious attempt to establish that
vague predicates must necessarily suffer from higher-order vagueness.
More precisely, Hyde has argued that the vagueness of ‘vague’ ensures
that the ‘paradigmatic conception’, according to which predicate vague-
ness is characterized by the presence of border cases, need not be
revised or further elaborated upon in order to account for the phenom-
enon of higher-order vagueness: if a predicate has border cases, it has
border border cases. Tye () has objected (convincingly I think) that
this is too strong: all that follows from Sorensen’s result is that there are
some border border cases, but not necessarily border border cases of
every vague predicate. I shall argue that this is still too strong:
Sorensen’s proof presupposes the existence of border border cases, hence
cannot be used to establish that fact on pain of circularity.
1. 
Sorensen’s argument for the vagueness of ‘vague’ goes as follows. First,
vague predicates give rise to the sorites paradox. For instance, the
vagueness of ‘small’ allows one to construct the following soritical
argument, in which a false conclusion is inferred from two seemingly
true premisses:
(a)  is small
(b) For every integer n: if n is small, then so is n+.
(c) Therefore,  is small.
Now, for every integer n, let ‘n-small’ be a numerical predicate defined
by the following condition:
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() k is n-small iff k is either small or less than n.
Clearly, ‘-small’ is just as vague as ‘small’: both apply to  and apply
exactly in the same way to all other integers. By contrast, when n is
clearly not small, say n=, then the extension of the predicate ‘n-
small’ is determined exclusively by the ‘less than n’ clause, and is there-
fore perfectly sharp: every integer less than  is -small, every other
integer is not. Since there is no clear value of n which marks the differ-
ence between predicates of the first sort (with border cases) and predi-
cates of the second sort (without border cases), one can now construct
a soritical argument for ‘vague’ that parallels (a)–(c):
(a) ‘-small’ is vague.
(b) For every integer n: if ‘n-small’ is vague, then so is ‘n+-small’.
(c) Therefore ‘-small’ is vague.
Consequently, ‘vague’ is vague.
Some commentators (for instance Deas ) have objected to this
line of reasoning on account of its parasitic form. After all, the vague-
ness exhibited by (a)–(c) is really not a feature of ‘vague’ but —
indirectly—a feature of ‘small’.1 This is a fair remark. However it is
hardly a relevant objection to Sorensen’s argument: certainly ‘married
to a bald man’ is truly a vague predicate, even though its vagueness is
entirely parasitic upon that of ‘bald’. At most, one can object to
Sorensen that his sorites series for ‘vague’ involves a class of very special
and somewhat artificial predicates. But this is an ad hoc manoeuvre. If
such predicates are accepted, then Sorensen’s argument is perfectly
sound.
2. 
Let us accept such predicates. Does Sorensen’s result support the claim
that there exist predicates that suffer from higher-order vagueness?
Hyde has argued that it does:
I think that there are higher orders of vagueness, but that this is already en-
tailed by the paradigmatic conception and can be seen to follow when the
1 Deas grounds his argument on the observation that () logically implies that ‘n-small’ is vague
iff n is small. But this is mistaken. The left-to-right direction of this biconditional can be resisted
by letting n be a border case of ‘small’. For then n is also a border case for ‘small or less than n’,
hence a border case for ‘n-small’. In other words, ‘n-small’ can be vague even when n is not small
(but, rather, a border case for ‘small’). 
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notion of ‘border case’ employed therein is properly understood. (Hyde
, p. ) 
In a nutshell, the argument is that on the paradigmatic conception the
vagueness of ‘vague’ entails the existence of border border cases in just
the same way that the vagueness of ‘small’ entails the existence of bor-
der cases for ‘small’. Here is a more detailed reconstruction of this line
of reasoning:
(a) On the paradigmatic conception, ‘… is vague’ can be analysed
as ‘there are border cases of …’. 
(b) The predicate ‘vague’ is vague.
(c) Hence, on the paradigmatic conception ‘there are border cases
of …’ is vague (from (a) and (b)).
(d) The quantifier ‘there are …’ is not vague.
(e) Hence, on the paradigmatic conception ‘border case of …’ is
vague (from (c) and (d)).
(f) Hence, on the paradigmatic conception there are border cases
of ‘border case of …’ (from (a) and (e)).
(g) Hence, on the paradigmatic conception there are predicates
that have border border cases (from (f)).
There is no question that this argument is valid. Thus, as long as we
accept (b) and (d), Hyde’s reasoning would seem to establish that the
‘paradigmatic conception’ implies the existence of some cases of
higher-order vagueness. (As I mentioned, Hyde’s original argument
attempts to establish a stronger result, namely, that every vague predi-
cate has border border cases. The present reconstruction takes Tye’s
objection into account.)
I do not wish to quarrel premiss (d) (though some might want to
do just that). And, of course, premiss (b) is precisely the upshot of
Sorensen’s argument. So is Hyde’s reasoning sound? It may well be (and
personally I think it is). The trouble is that in this context we cannot
rely on Sorensen’s argument to motivate (b), for that argument pre-
supposes the existence of border border cases. Specifically, it presup-
poses the existence of border border cases for ‘small’. To see this, notice
first that () equates the extension of ‘n-small’ with that of ‘either small
or less than n’. It follows that these two predicates have the same border
cases—that is,
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() k is a border case of ‘n-small’ iff k is a border case of ‘either
small or less than n’.
Since ‘less than n’ is precise for all n, this amounts to
() k is a border case of ‘n-small’ iff k is a border case of ‘small’ and
greater than or equal to n.2
And since every number is greater than or equal to itself, this in turn
implies
() k is a border case of ‘k-small’ iff k is a border case of ‘small’. 
Now, suppose that ‘small’ does not have border border cases: every
integer is either a positive case, or a negative case, or a border case of
‘small’. Suppose k is the cut-off point between the border cases and the
negative cases: k is a border case of ‘small’, but k+ is definitely not
small. Then, by (), k is a border case of ‘k-small’, which means that ‘k-
small’ is vague. But no number is a border case of ‘k+-small’, since (i)
every number less than or equal to k is less than k+, hence definitely
k+-small, and (ii) every number greater than k is definitely not small
(by assumption) and definitely not less than k+, hence definitely not
k+-small. So ‘k+-small’ is not vague. So there is some value of n
(namely k) such that ‘n-small’ is vague but ‘n+-small’ is not vague.
And this contradicts the inductive premiss (b) of the sorites argument
for ‘vague’. 
Of course, this is no objection to Sorensen’s argument, because
Sorensen is perfectly entitled to assume that ‘small’ has border border
cases. (In a way, this is reflected in the inductive premiss (b) of the
sorites argument for ‘small’, though we need not commit ourselves to
this way of characterizing higher-order vagueness.) But in the context
of Hyde’s argument we are not entitled to that assumption, on pain of
circularity. Thus, for the purpose of that argument Sorensen’s affidavit
of premiss (b) is unreliable: this premiss must be independently estab-
lished. Or it must be granted as obvious, as Austin (: f )
suggested. 3
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2 At least, this is true on any semantics for ‘or’ that makes a disjunction true as long as one of its
disjuncts is true (even though the other disjunct is indeterminate). 
3 Thanks to Haim Gaifman and Dominic Hyde for helpful discussion and exchanges.
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